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the transcendence of the 
social: durkheim, Weismann, 
and the purification of sociology
Maurizio Meloni*
Department of Sociological Studies, Sheffield University, Sheffield, UK
Building on Fox Keller’s acute genealogy of the nature–nurture opposition as located 
in a certain specific social, cultural, and political history in the late nineteenth century 
(2010), in this paper, I address a parallel problem: the making of a really modern (i.e., 
non-biological) sociology nearly at the same time as the “hard disjunction” (Keller, 2010) 
between heredity and the environment, nature and nurture, was made. I argue rather 
provocatively that traces of borrowing from hard heredity to sociology can be seen in 
Durkheim’s strategic usage of Weismann to destroy Lamarckian sociology. The tran-
scendence of the social in Durkheim is entirely isomorphic to Weismann’s transcendence 
of the germ plasm: in both cases, they aimed to construct objective realities, radically 
independent and exterior from individual tendencies and peculiarities. Weismann offered 
Durkheim an important scientific companion to make boundaries between sociology 
and biology. In a Latourian sense (Latour, 1993), the purification strategy of Durkheim 
was actually helped by a hybridization with Weismann’s biology. In conclusion, by taking 
Weismann as an anticipator of the genetics revolution a few years later, I argue for a pro-
found complicity between twentieth century non-biological sociology and genetics. They 
both made space for a neat distinction between biological heredity and sociocultural 
transmission, heredity, and heritage. If sociology and genetics thought of themselves as 
rivals and even enemies in explaining social facts, they should reconsider their positions.
Keywords: durkheim, Weismann, hard heredity, Lamarckism, sociology, biology, purification, boundary-work
introdUCtion
Weismann and the possibility of the social
This paper addresses the emergence during the late nineteenth century of a certain way of thinking 
that came to be seen in the twentieth century as self-evident for many social scientists and biologists 
alike. According to this way of thinking, “If something is not biological in origins, it must be social” 
or, alternatively, “If not social, it must be biological.” The many possible versions of this fundamental 
way of thinking can be easily found in hundreds of articles discussing behavioral, medical, or devel-
opmental issues. A slightly more sophisticated refinement introduces the view that traits, diseases, or 
behaviors are actually a bit of both or rather the result of an “interaction” or “combination” among the 
two kinds of causes, namely the biological and the social, nature and nurture, heredity, and environ-
ment. However, as Evelyn Fox Keller has noticed, this apparent synthesis creates more problems 
than one may think: “the notion of interaction presupposes the existence of entities that are at least 
ideally separable – i.e., it presupposes an a priori space between component entities” (Keller, 2010, 
p. 6, my italics).
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The argument of this article neither offers an alternative way 
of thinking to this a priori disjunction nor critiques its possible 
epistemological shortcomings. My interest is instead genealogi-
cal: how did we come to think this way? When and how did pos-
ing biological and social factors, blood and civilization, heredity 
and environment, as alternative domains, start to make sense, up 
to the point to become a sort of truism? In this article, I build 
on Keller’s acute genealogy of the nature–nurture opposition 
as located in a certain specific social, cultural, and political his-
tory in the late nineteenth century (2010), to bear on a broader 
problem: the making of a really modern (i.e., non-biological) 
sociology, which emerged with its idea of a purely social (i.e., 
non-psychobiological) level of causation nearly at the same time 
as this “hard disjunction” (Keller, 2010) between heredity and the 
environment, nature and nurture, was made.
Is there any connection between the emergence of the social as 
a non-biological and non-psychological source of causation and 
the making of the modern view of heredity (Johannsen, 1911)? 
Is just a coincidence that sociology – as we are told in nearly all 
textbooks  –  started to emancipate itself from biologism in the 
very last years of the nineteenth century, exactly in the arc of time 
between Weismann’s publication of his seminal compendium 
on heredity (Weismann, 1893a) and the rediscovery of Mendel 
(1900)? This relationship between history of sociology and his-
tory of science remains, in my view, one of the most overlooked 
in intellectual history. Building on an existing scholarship, in a 
previous article, I have already argued how Alfred Kroeber, a 
key figure in American anthropology, crucially depended on the 
incorporation of Galton and Weismann to purify anthropology 
from the “vitiated mixture” of organic and superorganic explana-
tions, i.e., Lamarckism [Meloni (2016a,b), also, see Kroenfeldner 
(2009)]. However, people may think that Kroeber is just an idi-
osyncratic case not generalizable to other cultural contexts and 
disciplines. In this article, I will argue for a parallel, though subtler, 
role of Weismann in the making of Durkheim’s sociology. I want 
to claim, rather provocatively, that the transcendence of the social 
in Durkheim (truly Durkheim’s trademark) is entirely isomorphic 
to Weismann’s transcendence of the germ plasm: in both cases, 
they aimed to construct objective realities radically independent 
and exterior from individual tendencies and peculiarities. The 
collective nature of the social is perfectly analogous to the col-
lective nature of hereditary tendencies established by Weismann 
(and Galton before him). As we shall see, Weismann offered 
Durkheim an important scientific support to make boundaries 
between sociology and biology. Since the discovery of Weismann 
in a footnote in the Division of Labor (Durkheim, 1893/1997), 
Durkheim borrowed from and capitalized on Weismann’s epis-
temic revolution, founding a scientific pendant to his idea of an 
ontological break between the social and the individual domain, 
i.e., a social fact is not the sum of many individual facts. This 
ontological hiatus, as I will show, was impossible to conceive 
under a nineteenth century Lamarckian framework, and instead 
corresponded perfectly to the modernization of heredity started 
by Galton and consolidated by Weismann, and later by genet-
ics. However, to understand this, it is important to go back to 
what happened before the bifurcation between the social and the 
biological took place, when this broadly Lamarckian framework 
was at its peak. I will focus here [summing up some of the themes 
of my recent Political Biology, see Meloni (2016a)] on two differ-
ent disciplinary bodies of knowledge in the nineteenth century: 
social theory and philosophy on one side; medical writings on 
heredity on the other.
the Complicity of the social and the 
Biological before the Big dichotomy
Social Theory and Philosophy
Before the word biology was coined in the early 1800, there are 
obviously many predecessors of a dichotomous understanding 
of the relationship between “nature” and “society” (if we want to 
use nature as a proxy for what will be later called the biological). 
In early modernity, Rousseau’s name comes easily to mind for his 
radical disjunction between nature and society. Rousseau, who 
was the first to use “social” as the adjective of society (Heilbron, 
1995), was also the most original representative of a trend that 
opposed the social order as non-natural to nature as non-social. 
Part of this naturalism transited into the next century in the 
form of an ethic and esthetic celebration of nature among the 
Romantics. However, Rousseau’s point was mostly normative, not 
aimed to parse human behavior in biological or social explana-
tions as antagonist causes. Moreover, if we look at things later in 
the nineteenth century, when the notion of the social starts to be 
more intensely theorized, an utterly dichotomous framework is 
indeed rare. For instance, the young Marx’s view in the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) contains a holistic under-
standing of the social in which “the social character” is not 
something opposed to “the natural,” but it is rather the totality 
of human relationships (natural ones included). In a different 
context and decade, John Stuart Mill’s view has been elegantly 
analyzed by Fox Keller (2010), and I can simply repeat her point 
here. In his Utilitarianism (1863), Mill considers “moral feelings” 
as “not innate, but acquired,” a statement that provoked Darwin’s 
distress in his Descent a few years later. Mill’s sentence may seem 
to reflect a twentieth century antagonism between nature and 
nurture. However, as Keller observes, in claiming that moral 
feelings are acquired, Mill was making an entirely non-dualistic 
point. If moral feelings are acquired, he wrote, “not for that reason 
[they are] the less natural. It is natural to man to speak, to reason, 
to build cities, to cultivate the ground, though these are acquired 
faculties” [Keller (2010); also, see Paul and Day (2008)].
Spencer provides an even clearer illustration here, given his 
recognized dependence on Lamarckism [Peel (1971); Bowler 
(1993); also, see Burrow (1966) and Offer (2010)]. In a Lamarckian 
context, as I have argued elsewhere (Meloni, 2016a,b), the social 
is always on the verge of turning into the biological, i.e., in a nine-
teenth century language, habits via use-inheritance are progres-
sively fixed and transmitted by heredity to the next generations. 
Use-inheritance necessarily undermines any strict boundary 
between the social and the biological, the mind and the body, 
as well as the acquired and the innate. As Spencer (1887/2013) 
said in his very Lamarckian Factors of Organic Evolution acquired 
characteristics “may, in the successions of individuals, generate 
innate tendencies to like or dislike such actions” (my italics). 
The sentence is obviously troubling for a twentieth century 
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understanding of the innate as fixed and therefore impossible to be 
generated by the influences of previous generations: but Spencer, 
as a Lamarckian, didn’t see a contradiction at all in looking at 
the innate as something generated from the deeds of previous 
generations.
However, the function of Lamarckism was not only to confuse 
(if not, make utterly impossible) the distinction between the 
innate and the generated, the social and the biological. It was 
essential for nineteenth century sociology that Lamarckism 
offered a key mechanism to connect organic and social evolu-
tion, biological and moral progress, thus making sociology 
coterminous with social evolutionism in a teleological and linear 
view [see Weinstein (1998); Gissis (2003)]. It is at the conjunction 
of three key arguments that Spencer makes organic and social 
progress indistinguishable. First, that morality has a physiological 
basis or rather is “a development of physiological truth” (Spencer, 
1851/1883, p. 31.6). Second, that human characteristics are mal-
leable by the environment – something especially true for higher 
civilizations deemed more plastic than others (thus establishing 
a hierarchy of civilizations based on plasticity). Third and finally, 
that use-inheritance is true, thus making moral progress, as a 
physiologically based feature, cumulatively transmissible across 
generations (Weinstein, 1998). Spencer is not shy to make the case 
for a clear sociological implication of his broader biological view: 
“If functionally-produced modifications are inheritable, then the 
mental associations habitually produced in individuals by experi-
ences of the relations between actions and their consequences, 
pleasurable or painful, may, in the successions of individuals, 
generate innate tendencies to like or dislike such actions. That our 
sociological beliefs must also be profoundly affected by the conclu-
sions we draw on this point, is obvious. If a nation is modified en 
masse by transmission of the effects produced on the natures of 
its members by those modes of daily activity which its institutions 
and circumstances involve; then we must infer that such institu-
tions and circumstances mould its members far more rapidly and 
comprehensively than they can do if the sole cause of adaptation 
to them is the more frequent survival of individuals who happen 
to have varied in favourable ways.” (Spencer, 1887/2013, p. 5–6, 
my italics).
This and similar worldviews were extremely widespread in the 
nineteenth century and not menaced by Darwin’s Origin of Species 
(Bowler, 1983, 2013). Such philosophies opposed the scary ran-
domness of Darwinian variation, with a reassuring teleological 
view of biological-cum-social progress, a steady advancement (as 
in biological ontogeny) from the homogenous to the complex, 
with little or no space chance. Regression and degeneration 
were definite possibilities, but faith in “perfectibility” was far 
stronger (Gissis, 2003). Before coming to the destruction of this 
Spencerian worldview (as a consequence of the emergence of 
hard heredity and later genetics), it is important to look quickly 
at a second body of scholarship: medical hereditarianism before 
hard heredity.
Heredity before Modern (Hard) Heredity 
in Medical Writings
It is very telling that until the eighteenth century the word heredity 
had mainly a juridical meaning [Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 
(2012), also, see Johannsen (1911)], while in a medical context, it 
was used only as an adjective (López-Beltrán, 2004).1 A significant 
change occurred only from the early nineteenth century, when the 
notion of hérédité or heredity started to be nominalized and inves-
tigated as a phenomenon in itself in medical writings, especially 
in France and Britain. However, what is meant by this hereditar-
ian literature is very different from our post-twentieth century 
understanding. Heredity meant, in the early and mid-nineteenth 
century, a complex entanglement of social and biological factors, 
innate, and acquired characteristics. It envisioned a blurred 
mechanism “beginning with conception and extending through 
weaning” (Rosenberg, 1974). A case in point is the enlightenment 
polymath Erasmus Darwin, Charles’ grandfather, who viewed 
heredity “as the result of a malleable admixture of nature and 
nurture causes.” (Wilson, 2007). Erasmus believed that exciting 
external causes produced structural changes in the organism 
and were then fixed into heredity. These views were very visible, 
for instance, in his poem The Temple of Nature: Or, The Origin 
of Society (1806): “The clime unkind, or noxious food instills to 
embryon nerves hereditary ills.” Erasmus wrote “The feeble births 
acquired diseases chase, Till Death extinguish the degenerate 
race” [cited in Wilson (2007), p. 137]. Erasmus’ citation is very 
early in the nineteenth century, but Charles himself, Erasmus’ 
grandson, still until 1868 (Variation of Animal and Plants under 
Domestication) held to a mechanism (which he named “pangen-
esis”) whereby direct communication existed between body cells 
and reproductive organs. This would be in flagrant violation of 
what we know today as genetics. A good illustration of the gap 
between Darwin and the modern view of heredity can be found in 
the quarrel between Darwin and his younger half-cousin Francis 
Galton on the empirical validity of pangenesis. Galton tested the 
gemmules hypothesized by Darwin and showed no circulation 
in the blood of these “reproductive elements.” After that episode, 
which we can consider as a sort of parting of the ways, Galton’s 
view of heredity developed autonomously and originally. A new 
view of heredity radically closed to environmental inputs was 
made after Darwin thanks to the converging effort of two different 
traditions of thought, one mostly statistical and anthropological 
championed by Galton, the other embryological represented by 
August Weismann (Churchill, 2015). The two views had much in 
common, and their conceptual impact went well beyond history 
of science as I will try to show next about Durkheim. However, 
it is important to focus quickly on the significance of the making 
of the modern knowledge regime of heredity (Müller-Wille and 
Rheinberger, 2007, 2012).
the Making of Hard Heredity in the 
Late nineteenth Century
The making of hard heredity in the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century is an event of immense importance, in sci-
ence and beyond it. As a significant body of scholarship has 
shown (Bowler, 1989), the same rediscovery of Mendel in 1900 
can be considered a delayed effect of the making of hard heredity. 
1 This section (pages 3–5) reproduces a few passages of my Political Biology (2016), 
Chapter 2.
4Meloni The Transcendence of the Social
Frontiers in Sociology | www.frontiersin.org July 2016 | Volume 1 | Article 11
Hard  heredity, or the modern notion of heredity (Johannsen, 
1911), is the notion that heredity is fixed at birth and is not 
affected directly by changes in the environment (Bonduriansky, 
2012). It was the making of this notion that created the epistemic 
space within which the Mendelian notion of a particulate and 
stable (unchangeable) hereditary material (later christened 
the gene) could be situated and Mendel “rediscovered.” As 
Weismann proudly claimed “Mendel’s law is an affirmation of 
the foundation of the germ-plasm theory” [quoted in Churchill 
(2015), p. 540].2 Leaving aside Galton’s key contribution, I will 
restrict my analysis to Weismann, for reasons of space, but 
also to advance my thesis about the structural analogies with 
Durkheim’s thought.
August Weismann
Celebrated by Mayr as “the greatest evolutionist after Darwin” 
(1985), August Weismann (1834–1914) stood for a transforma-
tion from the “original, flexible Darwinism” that could still 
make room for a “Lamarckian component in addition to natural 
selection” to a more “dogmatic” one [Bowler (1983), p. 75; also, 
see Mayr (1982)] in which natural selection was the exclusive 
and omnipotent source of individual variation. In the 1880s, 
Weismann tested Lamarckian inheritance by amputating the tails 
of more than 20 successive generations of mice. Their offspring 
all had intact tails. These experiments were intended to disprove 
the theory that acquired mutilations could be inherited across 
generations. Lamarckian inheritance, according to Mayr (1988), 
“never regained full credibility after Weismann’s attack,” though 
Lamarckians have disagreed on the significance of these experi-
ments. Weismann put on much shakier grounds the inheritance 
of acquired traits that was, at the time, nearly considered a com-
monsense view.
Since 1880s, Weismann was understood as the proposer of a 
crucial turn in the reconceptualization of heredity and evolution, 
“striking at the very root” (Wallace, 1889, p. 411) of all theories 
claiming for direct effects of the environment on heredity. Given 
these expectations, Weismann soon became a polarizing figure 
that could be embraced or fought against but could not leave 
things as they were before. Before Weismann, natural selection and 
Lamarckian inheritance were seen as concomitant factors in the 
process of selection differing only by degree, not kind (Romanes, 
1899). Heredity was a pluralistic mechanism. After Weismann, 
the polarization between these two mechanisms  –  natural 
selection and the inheritance of acquired characters  –  became 
extreme, giving rise to a series of ideological fights. The term 
neo-Lamarckians and neo-Darwinians were both created after 
Weismann’s first important works, between 1885 and 1888. The 
heated debate with Spencer in the early 1890s [e.g., Spencer 
(1893a,b); Weismann (1893a)] is very representative of this clash 
between what, after Weismann, emerged as two irreconcilable 
worldviews. Weismann’s idea of heredity was known as the theory 
of the “continuity of germ plasm” and was based on the assumed 
2 I am well aware that this simplifies a complex debate on the transition from a 
speculative view of heredity in Weismann to the experimentalism of geneticists. 
This, however, has to be left aside in this paper.
“existence of a special organised and living hereditary substance, 
which in all multicellular organisms, unlike the substance com-
posing the perishable body of the individual, is transmitted from 
generation to generation” (Weismann, 1893a, p. xi). The doctrine 
of the continuity of germ plasm is a fundamentally dualist one, 
based on a “contrast between the somatic and the reproductive 
cells” (Weismann, 1893a, p. 183). As Mary Jane West-Eberhard in 
a now classic work explains, “The cells of the soma participate in 
growth and differentiation, but then they die, while the germline 
cells, set aside early in development, serve as an uncontaminated 
bridge to the next generation” (1993: 331). What was destroyed 
by this view was any bridge between the individual and the race. 
This is the opposite of a Lamarckian–Spencerian view in which 
individual acquisitions are passed on and become fixed into 
the heredity of the group. As I shall argue next, this ontological 
hiatus between the race and the individual – made possible by the 
destruction of the Lamarckian bridge of use-inheritance – was 
understood by Durkheim as a scientific pendant of his also 
dichotomous view of the hiatus between social and individual life. 
To convey this idea of an impossible communication between 
“characters acquired by the adult body” and germ plasm (Bowler, 
2009), Weismann used a metaphor that Durkheim would have 
probably liked: to suppose communication between what is 
acquired during a lifetime and the hereditary substance “is very 
like supposing that an English telegram to China is there received 
in the Chinese language” (Weismann, 1904).
Weismann, Weismannism, and a Legacy 
to Reevaluate
Underneath the image of Weismann as the man who destroyed 
Lamarckism, a more nuanced historiographical tradition has 
established that the German embryologist pioneered elements 
of a radically new vision of heredity while adhering to old 
developmental views that persisted until his last publications 
(Bowler, 1989; Winther, 2001; Novak, 2008; Churchill, 2015). 
There is no doubt that broader political pressures (Winther, 
2001) hardened the Weismannian dichotomy between non-
heritable somatic variations and germ plasm heredity into a 
broader ideology, “Weismannism.” This ideology was at the heart 
of swelling eugenic and hard hereditarian schools of thought in 
the early twentieth century. Weismann was seen as buttressing 
a conservative racial argument, bringing support to the racial 
hygiene movement in or the militaristic ideology of the ruling 
elites in Germany (Crook, 1994). Nevertheless, beneath the more 
ideological uses, if not caricatures, of Weismann’s thought, his 
profound and long-lasting impact as an original thinker has 
to be entirely reevaluated, especially in its implications for the 
social sciences and ideas of social reform and progress. Beyond 
politics, the rise of Weismannism (or Neo-Darwinism) was 
seen as a huge intellectual catastrophe for the social sciences as 
well. Herbert Spencer understood Weismann as a menace for 
“Education, Ethics, and Politics” (Spencer, 1893a, p. 488). Lester 
Frank Ward (1841–1913), the prominent neo-Lamarckian and 
first president of the American Sociological Association, was 
similarly perturbed by Weismann, the new “great prophet of 
science.” If hard heredity were true, he surmised, social progress 
would be lost. How could it be otherwise if each generation’s 
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political, moral, and educational efforts were erased with the 
rise of the next?
If nothing that the individual gains by the most heroic 
or the most assiduous effort can by any possibility be 
handed on to posterity, the incentive to effort is in great 
part removed. If all the labor bestowed upon the youth 
of the race to secure a perfect physical and intellectual 
development dies with the individual to whom it is 
imparted why this labor? (…) In fact the whole burden of 
the Neo-Darwinian song is: Cease to educate, it is mere 
temporizing with the deeper and unchangeable forces 
of nature. And we are thrown back upon the theories of 
Rousseau, who would abandon the race entirely to the 
feral influences of nature. (Ward, 1891, p. 65)
Thus, Weismannism was initially received as a reactionary and 
exclusionary doctrine in politics, supporting fatalist and nation-
alist views, while from the perspective of the social sciences, it 
seemed to offer few, if any, advantages. However, Weismannism 
inspired less intuitive political corollaries, as well, both in politics 
and in terms of knowledge–production. Before looking in detail 
at what Durkheim borrowed from Weismann, the subtle and 
richer implications of Weismannism have to be emphasized. 
I will focus here on two points.
First, in politics, there is an obvious consequence of 
Weismannism that was seriously overlooked by Lamarckians. As 
various Neo-Darwinists have claimed in different contexts, from 
Alfred Russel Wallace to Yuri Filipchenko and Julian Huxley, 
the degenerative effects of the environment would be contained 
and even neutralized by an impervious hereditary substance (see 
Meloni, 2016a). After all, if the good effects of education could 
not be attached to heredity, then the ill effects of unequal social 
structures would also be kept at bay. As heirs of the twentieth 
century, we struggle to understand how hard heredity could be 
progressive because we tend to associate the emphasis on the 
environment as typical of social reform movements. However, in a 
period where claims of the degeneration of races and classes were 
so widespread because of their repeated exposure to pathogenic 
environments, Weismannism had a liberating potential. Alfred 
Russel Wallace (who was a Weismannian and an anti-eugenist) 
claimed that it was a “relief ” to know, after Weismann, that all the 
“evil and degradation” of human history will leave no permanent 
traces once “a more rational and more elevating system of social 
organization is brought about” (Wallace, 1892).
A second point regarding knowledge production is vividly 
exemplified by Kroeber’s use of Galton and Weismann to chal-
lenge the confusion of organic and superorganic in Lamarckian 
explanations (Kroenfeldner, 2009; Meloni, 2016b). It is on this 
point in particular that we need to reflect to see what sort of 
potential Durkheim saw in Weismann. The separation of hered-
ity from individual lifetime acquisitions allowed Weismann to 
draw out three consequences of the utmost importance for the 
social sciences. The first was to radically separate the connection 
between biological and social development, making Spencerian 
social evolutionism impossible and driving a “wedge” (Peel, 1971) 
between the evolution of life and that of society. After Weismann, 
social evolution as a whole is no longer there, but split into two. 
The second was to radically separate individual actions from 
their hereditary substance, freeing the individual from the 
yoke of their ancestors’ deed, and making heredity a much less 
personal force; a generic one, as Durkheim clearly saw. The third 
consequence, in delimiting heredity to the germ plasm, was to 
release the whole body (sexual elements excluded), and above 
all, its environmental influences from hereditarian mechanisms, 
with general emancipatory effects for the sciences that aimed at 
studying this environmental and now extra-hereditarian dimen-
sion, as Kroeber saw better than anyone else. After Weismann, 
what connects human generations across time belongs to two 
utterly separated domains: an internal perpetuating germ 
plasm, subject of biological and evolutionary investigations; and 
cultural, educational, and social processes, now disentangled 
from the vicissitudes of biological heredity. Such drawing of 
boundaries could not be missed by someone like Durkheim who, 
as a good follower of Boutroux, was looking for epistemic fences 
to delimit and anchor each science to its own purified domain.
durkheim as a Weismannian
There are only two citations of Weismann in Durkheim’s work, 
to my knowledge. Both are in footnotes, the first in Division 
of Labour (DL, Durkheim, 1893) and the second in Suicide (S, 
Durkheim, 1897/2002). This paucity of explicit references may 
justify the fact that all commentators have overlooked the sig-
nificant way in which Durkheim borrows from the hard-heredity 
revolution to make ontological room for his transcendence of the 
social. My key thesis is not only that, as we shall see in more detail 
below, Weismann supplies Durkheim with a powerful scientific 
companion to make the social transcendent, but more importantly 
that the structure of Durkheim’s theory is entirely isomorphic to 
Weismann’s. Durkheim’s dichotomy of society and individual 
maps perfectly onto Weismann’s dichotomy of germ plasm and 
transient individual bodies. Both challenge some form of empiri-
cism in their own field.3 For both, it is not individual experience 
(contra Spencer, a common enemy) that makes general categories 
(Durkheim, 1915, p. 13), such as society or heredity: the social 
and the germplasm have a flavor of immortality that is certainly 
not allowed in the individual. Beyond this morphological sym-
metry, Durkheim and Weismann have much in common4: both 
3 While the Kantian influence on Durkheim (via Renouvier and Boutroux) is 
obvious and highlighted by numerous commentators [see, for instance, Lukes 
(1985), Hamilton (1995), Stedman Jones (2002), and Pickering (2002)], one might 
only speculate how/if such an influence acted on Weismann. In passing, Churchill 
(2015), the most important historical authority on Weismann, reports of a dis-
missive comment of the German biologist against the obscurity of the philosopher 
but emphasizes the profound dependence of Nägeli (an important source for 
Weismann’s theory of heredity) on Kant (Churchill, 2015), p. 56; 226].
4 It may be worth noting that chronologically, the two were separated by one 
generation, as Weismann was born in 1834 and Durkheim in 1858. They died, 
respectively, at the beginning and during WWI, Weismann in 1914 and Durkheim 
in 1917. Weismann’s key scientific years were the 1880s and Durkheim’s the 1890s. 
It is also important to notice, and I thank the first reviewer for highlighting this, 
that an equal movement of autonomization of disciplines was started in parallel at 
the time in psychiatry and psychology by authors like Charcot, Janet, and particu-
larly Wundt (an important reference for Durkheim), a trend that well-matched 
Durkheim’s interest in Weismann.
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portrayed themselves as initiator of an epistemological break 
in their disciplines; both were passionate boundary-makers [in 
the sense of Gieryn (1983, 1999)], aiming to clearly demarcate a 
positively founded science from the vestiges of long-held opin-
ions; both were great modernizers [in the sense of Latour (1993)] 
who deployed a largely dichotomous vocabulary to restructure 
their scientific fields: any spurious element, be it individualism 
or Lamarckianism, had to be zealously rejected to achieve a puri-
fied view of social or biological heredity. Both had a profound 
faith in positive science and were aware they were situated at a 
critical juncture in their respective disciplines’ transition to a 
more mature stage. Finally, in their political implications, they 
were very ambivalent creatures, whose legacy had the common 
destiny of being interpreted in opposite directions, conservative 
and progressive, romantic and positivist.
Even a superficial knowledge of both authors and their scien-
tific context invites one to draw parallels. However, the critique 
has wholly overlooked any connection between the two: no 
references to Weismann can be found in any of the key scholar-
ship texts [see, for instance, Lukes (1985); Mucchielli (1998)]. 
Among mainstream interpretations of Durkheim, we are told 
that he belonged to the 1890s generation who “were nurtured 
in a Republican milieu and were influenced by neo-Lamarckian 
theory of evolution and heredity” (Fournier, 2005, p. 60), but the 
way in which he used or rejected this milieu is not addressed. In 
his vast reconstruction of the discovery of the social, Mucchielli 
(1998) uses the category of “antinaturalistic reaction” or “critique 
of biological determinism” to trace the evolution of sociology 
from the biological to the social, though never addressing whether 
this reaction could be done without any relationship to epistemic 
changes within biology itself. A few authors analyze Durkheim’s 
theory of race [Fenton (1980); Lehmann (1995); Paligot (2006); 
also, see Fields and Fields (2012)], which is connected to his 
view of heredity, but once again very scant details appear on 
Durkheim’s knowledge of biology. A few others look at pos-
sible common spaces between Durkheimian notions like social 
solidarity or morality and biology or socio-psychology (Gofman, 
2014; Weiss and Peres, 2014). Mainstream interpretations recog-
nize that some key notions in Durkheim were “strongly moulded 
by nineteenth-century biology and medicine” [Lukes (1982), p. 
146; also, see La Capra (2001)], but we are left in doubt about the 
specific quality of this knowledge.
Among non-mainstream interpreters of Durkheim, there are 
a few authors who have looked more extensively (and bravely) 
at the importance of biological themes in the development of 
Durkheim’s thought, challenging the stereotype of Durkheim’s 
antibiologism. Hirst (1973), for instance, analyzes in-depth the 
way in which Durkheim’s sociology borrows from biological 
themes either in terms of metaphors or analogies. Although 
Hirst overlooks the influence of Weismann, he offers a convinc-
ing argument that Durkheim sees in Darwin (with his concept 
of random variations) the possibility to break away from the 
teleological progressionism of Lamarckians like Spencer. This is, 
in my view, a first important wound to the notion of a simple 
neo-Lamarckian influence on Durkheim because of the cultural 
landscape in which he was immersed. Nye (1982, 1984) has 
highlighted the reliance of Durkheim on a Lamarckian repertoire 
in the early phases of his work, especially in Durkheim’s 1888 
article on mental pathology that features quasi-degenerationist 
themes. However, as Hawkins (1999) has pointed out, Durkheim’s 
later trajectory can be seen as a progressive break with this 
degenerationist, Lamarckian model. Hawkins emphasizes the 
emancipatory value of Durkheim’s notion of non-dysfunctional 
criminality to de-pathologize its figure but does not perceive 
Weismann as important in this abandoning of Lamarckian views 
of heredity. Finally, Gissis (2003) has written by far the most 
extensive treatment of the influence of Lamarckism on French 
sociology, and in this light, she analyzes the relationship between 
Durkheim and biology. Gissis’s argument is that the Lamarckian 
idiom was quintessential in grounding Durkheim’s solidarist 
perspective and finding an alternative to the individualism and 
organicism endorsed by Worms and his supporters. According 
to Gissis, Durkheim and the Durkheimians naturally inclined 
to Lamarckian explanations given Lamarck’s “methodological 
and epistemological (but not ontological) priority of the col-
lectivity.” I am not entirely convinced by the point. Although 
Lamarckism was a very flexible conceptual repertoire (Meloni, 
2016a), it is rather difficult to enroll Lamarckism entirely on the 
side of collectivity against individuality: Spencer, a Lamarckian 
and an individualist, provides the clearest counter-example here. 
But, there is a more important argument in my view, i. e. that 
Durkheim understood the neo-Darwinian view of race and 
heredity (i.e., Weismann) exactly as a denial of individuality, 
which is instead central in a Lamarckian view of race (shared by 
Spencer) where race is made by the accumulation of individual 
modifications. Looking at the chronology, Gissis’ detailed analysis 
is in fact less at odds with my argument than it may seem. As 
Gissis (2003) recognizes, Lamarckism was first used and then 
abandoned by Durkheim; when the credibility of Lamarckism 
started to wane, Durkheimians moved away in search of other 
theoretical models. My argument can be seen as an addition to 
Gissis: I want to highlight how important the understanding of 
Weismann was in 1890s for this transition out of Lamarckism. 
Even more subtly, as I have shown in the case of Kroeber (Meloni, 
2016b), the incorporation of Weismann did not just allow a move 
away from Lamarckian biology but, given its dualistic framework, 
from biology as such, thereby allowing the emergence of the social 
as something transcending the organic.
reading durkheim’s Weismann
The very few references to Weismann in Durkheim’s work pro-
vide a partial justification for the gap in scholarship addressing 
Weismann’s legacy and influence on Durkheim. However, those 
references that do exist are significant and strategic, not merely 
ornamental.
In fact, they are all the more important, considering the time 
and disciplinary context of Durkheim’s work: time, because 
Weismann’s key compendium on heredity appeared in 1892, and 
was translated into French the same year (Essais sur l’hérédité et 
la sélection naturelle) just 1 year before DL was published; and 
discipline, given the usually angry responses that Weismann and 
neo-Darwinism obtained by sociologists (with Spencer and Ward 
being rather typical of this frustration). In this difficult context, 
it is evident that Durkheim looks at Weismann with eyes that 
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are different from other sociologists or fellow nationals (who 
often depicted him as “a German menace to French biological 
research”: Gissis, 2003). Instead, Durkheim saw in Weismann a 
methodological brother-in-arms, as it is evident from the three 
key works of Durkheim in the 1890s.
Division of Labour in Society (DL 1893)
The first reference to Weismann’s work in Durkheim’s writings 
appears in a footnote of DL. Weismann’s work is introduced in 
the conclusion of Chapter 4. To give some context, Chapters 3 
and 4 are a long detour devoted to the study of various “sec-
ondary factors” that have, beyond social causes as such, a role 
in explaining, hampering, or speeding the division of labour. 
Chapter 4, in particular, is devoted to one of those non- or pre-
social factors: heredity. The knowledge that Durkheim displays 
of the heredity debate in the mid- and late-nineteenth century is 
more than erudite: it shows a real engagement with an issue that 
has important sociological consequences. Durkheim discusses 
at length key authors, such as Prosper Lucas, Galton, Lombroso, 
and de Candolle. Here, Durkheim advances a notable argument, 
which will recur again in Suicide, about the waning of heredity 
both in human evolution and as a social institution. In this latter 
case, it is the progression of the division of labor to more com-
plex and specialized forms that results in a decline of the social 
significance of heredity. As Durkheim writes “the importance 
of heredity in the social organisation of labour is all the greater 
when that labour is less divided up” (DL: 258). Before proceeding 
to an analysis of the reference to Weismann, two things are worth 
remarking here in Chapter 4. First, there are no ambiguities in 
Durkheim’s usage of heredity as a modern concept: heredity is 
about the fixed and the innate, something that is opposed to the 
social environment and cannot be generated by it, as in Erasmus 
Darwin or Spencer. The lesson of Galton, cited at length, seems 
to be fully internalized. Second, Durkheim makes a clear con-
nection between the emergence of a contemporary science of 
heredity and its waning significance in society. It is just because 
heredity declines as an article of faith, replaced “by a faith that 
is almost its opposite” (i.e., the power of the individual in shap-
ing his destiny), that we are now in the conditions to study it. 
Heredity, Durkheim adds “did not come into the purview of 
science until the moment when it had almost vanished from that 
of belief. Yet there is no contradiction here. For what, finally, 
the common consciousness affirms is not that heredity does 
not exist, but that its importance is less great, and science, as 
we shall see, reveals nothing that contradicts this view” (DL: 250, 
my italics). I want to argue here that the “science” that reveals a 
diminution of the significance of heredity is exactly Weismann’s 
“hereditarianism.” It is precisely in the context of an argument 
for which “the individual is tied less strongly to his past” and “it 
is easier for him to adapt to new circumstances as they occur,” 
that the reference to Weismann is introduced in a long footnote, 
which ends the chapter.
What Durkheim says is extremely interesting. In spite of 
striking a (diplomatic?) note of cautiousness about the conclusive 
anti-Lamarckian evidence produced by Weismann, he is in no 
doubt about taking Weismann on board as a champion of his 
diagnosis of the diminishing power of heredity. This interpretation 
is brilliant, original, and nearly unique at the time. Durkheim 
understands Weismann in a way that goes against the grain of 
how Weismannism was generally understood in right-wing, 
racial hygiene quarters (Weindling, 1989): not race and hered-
ity as fate, but exactly the breaking of fate, because individual 
variations (the legacy of the past) no longer have direct impact 
on future generations. Weismann, the scientist of heredity par 
excellence, is also in sum the liquidator of the burden of heredity. 
Why? Because from Weismann, Durkheim gets a twofold lesson, 
which will become increasingly relevant in his future work.
First, that what is transmitted in biological heredity, after 
Weismann and contra Spencer, is not the individual type but 
a broader and therefore vaguer “generic type” (the germ plasm 
for Weismann or the stirp for Galton). “Not so easily affected 
by individual variations, as has on occasion been supposed,” 
Durkheim writes (DL: 268) this generic type implies that what 
heredity transmits is not the specific determinations resulting 
from individual actions and tendencies but a generic substratum 
of faculties and propensities. As a collective property of the race 
rather than the result of the individual actions, heredity is radi-
cally depersonalized. What results is that “the more indeterminate 
and plastic this [generic] type, the more also the individual factor 
gains ground” (DL: 268), making heredity’s yoke lighter. The pas-
sage could have been stronger, as if Durkheim is just starting to 
realize the importance of this shift in the view of heredity. But, it 
is clear that this paragraph has to be read against the background 
of a series of passages in the chapter where it is emphasized 
again and again that “what heredity transmits consists more and 
more in indeterminate predispositions, general ways of feeling 
and thinking” that only at the social level do they become then 
specialized “in a thousand different ways.” Although the reading 
of de Candolle may have played a role in this interpretation [see 
on de Candolle, Fancher (1983)], such a quintessentially socio-
logical way of thinking is the natural ally of Weismann’s view of 
heredity as being confined to the collective level and not affected 
by individual variations. One can compare several passages of DL 
to what Weismann himself writes to deny the inheritance of a 
specific artistic talent: “The Bach family shows that musical talent, 
and the Bernoulli family that mathematical power, can be trans-
mitted from generation to generation, but this teaches us nothing 
as to the origin of such talents (…). Gauss was not the son of a 
mathematician; Handel’s father was a surgeon, of whose musical 
powers nothing is known; Titian was the son and also the nephew 
of a lawyer, (…) a man is not born a physicist or a botanist, and 
in most cases chance alone determines whether his endowments are 
developed in either direction.” (1893a, p. 96–97, my italics).
It is this way of thinking in which the idea of a specific musi-
cal talent is dissolved and replaced by a broader faculty that put 
Weismann’s thought very much in line with Durkheim’s idea of 
a generic force of heredity that can then take many social forms. 
This Durkheim–Weismann line is obviously very different from a 
strictly Lamarckian view in which musical talent, as an inherited 
characteristic, is passed interpersonally in families of musicians, 
as Spencer wanted. But, it is also very different from the crude 
hereditarianism of the first generation of eugenicists who believed 
in a specific “wandering impulse” running in families of sailors, as 
Davenport (1915) did, for instance.
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However, there is a second lesson from Weismann, even 
more important than the first, contained in this dense footnote, 
a lesson that will become the true mark of Durkheim’s hidden 
Weismannism. It is the key notion that between the individual 
and the “collective type” or race, there is in Weismann an onto-
logical gap, exactly the chasm existing in Durkheim, between the 
social and the individual. The passage is worth citing entirely:
From another viewpoint also these theories [of 
Weismann] are of interest to us. One of the conclusions 
of our work to which we attach the most importance 
is this idea that social phenomena derive from social 
and not psychological causes. Also, the collective type 
is not the mere generalisation of an individual type, 
but on the contrary the latter arises from the collective 
type. For a different order of facts Weismann likewise 
shows that the race is not a mere prolongation of the 
individual; that the specific type, from the physiological 
and anatomical viewpoint, is not an individual type 
that has perpetuated itself over time, but that has its 
own course of evolution. Also the individual type has 
detached itself from the collective type, far from being 
its source. His views are, like ours, it seems, a protest 
against the simplistic theories that reduce the composite 
to the simple (DL: 268, my italics).
Durkheim is here rejecting the empiricism of Spencer where 
categories are made by individual actions [similarly, see Durkheim 
(1915), p. 13], and Weismann is doing exactly the same in his 
own field. The resonance between the two views is exceptionally 
vivid here: just as in Durkheim, the social is outside the reach of 
individual, so in Weismann, the germ plasm is situated outside 
the reach of any “variation that takes place in individuals of 
the species.” Exactly as in Durkheim, the social transcends the 
will and consciousness of the individuals, so in Weismann, the 
germ plasm is a transcendent entity “on which individuals get 
attached as excrescences” (Ansell-Pearson, 2003, p. 6). Durkheim 
certainly had in mind the following passage from William Platt 
Ball, a scientific popularizer quoted in the same footnote, who in 
his 1890 any anti-Lamarckian text Are the effects of use inherited? 
made (correctly) a similar analogy to describe the new view of 
heredity:
Galton compares parent and child to successive pen-
dants on the same chain. Weismann likens them to 
successive offshoots thrown up by a long underground 
root or sucker (Ball, 1890, p. 66).
It is likely that this type of analogy struck more than one 
chord in Durkheim. As we shall see in Suicide in particular, 
this new view of heredity became a sort of implicit scientific 
legitimation for Durkheim’s primacy of the social as ontologi-
cally irreducible to individual actions, a sui generis thing. This 
ontological gap was the same Weismann had in mind for his 
own theory of heredity where “all parts of the body do not 
contribute to produce a germ from which the new individual 
arises, but (…) on the contrary, the offspring owes its origin to a 
peculiar substance of extremely complicated structure, viz., the 
germ-plasm” (Weismann, 1893a, p. 11–12).
The Rules of Sociological Method (R, 1895)
Let us come now to the Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim, 
1895/1982). Here, there are neither explicit references to 
Weismann nor is heredity a particular central focus of this classic 
book. Durkheim’s conceptual engagement with heredity can be 
considered transitional in this work, between the central treatment 
it takes in DL (an entire chapter) and the critical analysis of race 
and heredity in Suicide, which I shall address next. Nonetheless, 
in a text that is foundational in establishing boundaries between 
the social and other domains, and between sociology and other 
disciplines, from my hypothesis, it should follow that this could 
not happen without any evaluation of the parallel status of the 
biological. As is well known, the Rules is the book where social 
facts are defined in their exclusivity, as a self-standing category on 
which the professional monopoly of the sociologist can be fully 
exercised. As Durkheim writes, there is “a category of facts which 
present very special characteristics,” something that “cannot be 
confused with organic phenomena, nor with psychical phenom-
ena,” a “new species” to which the term social “must be exclusively 
assigned.” These special facts are “consequently the proper field of 
sociology” (R: 52). This is a seminal moment for the emergence 
of the social as a purified category, and it would be a significant 
challenge to my argument if this delimitation of the social could 
occur regardless of any take on biology.
Once again, radically overlooked by commentators, a passage 
in Chapter 4 clearly illustrates how Durkheim had, 2 years after 
DL, fully assimilated the Weismannian lesson. It is because of 
this incorporation that Durkheim, I want to argue, can establish 
a radically dichotomous mode of functioning between the social 
and the biological that breaks at its core any temptation to estab-
lish a synthetic social evolutionism as in Spencer. Let us offer a 
bit of context first. Chapter 4, the “Rules for the Constitution of 
Social Types,” is the place where Durkheim lays out his “social 
morphology” aimed “to constitute and classify social types” 
(R: 111). Here, Durkheim introduces the key concept of social 
species as intermediate entities between the extreme nominal-
ism of historians (with their “confused multitude of historical 
societies”) and the realism of philosophers (with their “unique, 
although ideal, concept of humanity” R: 109). The notion of 
social species is foundational to the production of a system of 
social classification, a “complete scale of social types” starting 
from the simplest, the horde (“protoplasm of the social realm”) 
and then, via a system of combinations and differentiation, the 
clan and more complex social forms and structures. The use of 
morphology in a taxonomic sense is obviously in analogy with 
its biological usage (Hirst, 1973). Are we then back to organicist 
sociologies that cannot distinguish the social from the natural? 
Durkheim seems to dance dangerously on the border of biologi-
cal analogies, exactly in a text where the demarcation has to be 
neat and unambiguous. If morphology is a way of conducting 
research that is available to both sociologists and biologists, 
as commentators highlight (Lukes, 1985), from where can a 
radical difference emerge? How can confusion be avoided in the 
use of the cross-disciplinary notion of species? As Durkheim 
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recognizes, by using the notion of species, we are moving on a 
slippery terrain. As he claims: “there are social species for the 
same reason as there are biological ones. The latter are due to 
the fact that the organisms are only varied combinations of the 
same anatomical unity” (R: 116). This is obviously a situation 
of potential confusion, very much in need of a boundary that 
may help avoid any transgression of field. It is at this point that 
Weismann comes to hand. The passage is here worth citing in its 
entirety for the way in which it can dramatically separate social 
from biological species making use of the core anti-Lamarckian 
argument:
“However, from this viewpoint, there is a great dif-
ference between the two domains. With animals, a 
special factor, that of reproduction, imparts to specific 
characteristics a force of resistance that is lacking else-
where. These specific characteristics, because they are 
‘common to a whole line of ancestors, are much more 
strongly rooted in the organism. They are therefore 
not easily whittled away by the action of particular 
individual environments but remain consistently 
uniform in spite of the diverse external circumstances. 
An inner force perpetuates them despite countervailing 
factors in favour of variation which may come from 
outside. This force is that of hereditary habits. This is 
why biological characteristics are clearly defined and 
can be precisely determined.” With the social domain, 
instead, things are radically different. As he continues: 
“In the social kingdom this internal force does not exist. 
Characteristics cannot be reinforced by the succeeding 
generation because they last only for a generation. 
(Ils  ne peuvent être renforcés par la génération parce 
qu’ils ne durent qu’une generation). In fact as a rule the 
societies that are produced are of a different species 
from those which generated them, because the latter, by 
combining, give rise to an entirely fresh organisational 
pattern. (….) The distinctive attributes of the species 
do not therefore receive reinforcement from heredity 
to enable them to resist individual variations. But they 
are modified and take on countless nuances through the 
action of circumstances. (R: 116–117).
This text is extraordinarily dense and complex. It deserves to 
be analyzed carefully to see the different ways the modern view of 
heredity is incorporated and used for Durkheim’s own sociological 
goals. First and more visibly, the difference between the biological 
and the social kingdom is made possible by the fact that inherited 
characteristics are impossible. The Weismannian lesson, still cau-
tiously approached 2 years before, is now no longer in question, at 
least for the social domain. If acquired characteristics are heritable, 
as Spencer believes, the social would be coterminous with the bio-
logical, subject to the same regime of functioning: in biology as in 
culture, the next generation would inherit the acquisitions of the 
earlier one. Instead, we have here two very distinctive domains. 
The first is a domain of biological perpetuation based on an inner 
force that is insensitive to external signals: in this first domain, 
it has to be noticed, Durkheim uses an ambiguous language of 
hereditary habits, but obviously he is referring to ideas of heredity 
as interiorized and hard, “not easily whittled away by the action 
of particular individual environments,” “consistently uniform in 
spite of the diverse external circumstances” (R: 116). A few years 
later, genetics will come to occupy this space of unresponsiveness 
to external signals. Out of this kingdom of biological reproduc-
tion, dominated by the inertial force of ancestral heredity, a 
second domain – the social – emerges, that lacks this inner force 
and is completely determined by “the action of circumstances” 
(R: 117). Here, once again supporting a minority interpretation 
of Weismann, what Durkheim emphasizes in the destruction 
of use-inheritance is emancipation from the yoke of heredity: 
“the societies that are produced are of a different species from 
those which generated them, because the latter, by combining, 
give rise to an entirely fresh organisational pattern” (R: 116). This 
resonates profoundly with Weismann’s own interpretation of his 
work, i.e., “the hypothesis of the continuity of the germ-plasm 
gives an identical starting-point to each successive generation.” 
(Weismann, 1893a, p. 168). To go back to the main point, what 
we have here is a polarized scenario, in which the force of heredity 
is confined to the biological, and the freedom of change at each 
generation becomes to trademark of the social. What is missing? 
Nothing important to our eyes, but a substantial certainty for 
nineteenth century authors: the Lamarckian third way, an inner 
force of heredity, but shaped by the action of circumstances, a 
plastic heredity. In destroying this third way, the link connect-
ing the social and the biological is also destroyed. Two different 
stories can commence, no longer at risk of liaisons dangereuses.
Suicide (S, 1897)
With Suicide, I come to the third and last stage of the incorpora-
tion of the hard hereditarian revolution as a key scientific support 
for the transcendence of the social. Suicide is the book where 
the social, in its autonomy and self-standing authority, finds “a 
new and especially conclusive proof ” (S: 274). From this point 
of view, Suicide does not present a new argument but puts the 
insights anticipated in DL and Rules on a firmer base. The two key 
intuitions emerging from the two previous books are confirmed 
with a higher level of confidence by Durkheim. To reiterate, these 
are: first, that heredity is narrowed, delimited, and restricted to 
just the transmission of generic characteristics. It therefore loses 
the level of penetration and personalization given to it by the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics; second, that the social 
fully transcends individual deeds, exactly as race in Weismann’s 
“positive science” transcends its individual members.
The first of these points is made repeatedly in the book on “the 
extra-social causes” of suicide. Heredity is not denied, so much 
as generalized to lose its penetrative force: “heredity” Durkheim 
writes:
plays an important role; but it is no longer the heredity 
of suicide. What is transmitted is the general mental 
affliction, the nervous weakness of which suicide is a 
contingent result, though one always to be apprehended. 
In this case heredity has nothing more to do with the 
tendency to suicide than with hemoptysis in cases of 
hereditary tuberculosis (S: 45).
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The genericity of heredity is a key way to deny a direct and 
whole passage of “the tendency to self-destruction (…) from par-
ents to children and which, once transmitted, gives birth wholly 
automatically to suicide” (S: 42) as in a hereditarian–psychologi-
cal view of heredity. This is no longer possible because “what is 
transmitted is not the affliction itself but only a field such as to 
favor its development” (S: 43). A Lamarckian view would be open 
to a similar critique, whereby it is the personal experience of the 
previous generation that shapes the instinct of the next, making 
the relation between self-destruction in parents and in children 
more intimate. Once again, only hard heredity (in the sense of this 
less common reading of Weismann) may favor the secularization 
of heredity, making it a generic and less invasive force.
The second point repeats, in a more assertive fashion, the 
interaction with Weismann already highlighted in DL. It is worth 
following the text strictly because this is one of the key passages in 
the invention of Durkheim’s sociologism, where Tarde is taken as 
the main target. Exactly at the end of this long passage, Weismann 
is called upon to offer scientific validation to the autonomy of the 
social as a transcendent, collective force. To offer again further 
context: this occurs in the chapter discussing the social element 
of suicide, part of Book II (Social Causes and Social Types). What 
Durkheim is arguing is that Suicide offers an empirical confirma-
tion of his key intuition that the social is not merely a manner 
of speaking, an innocuous metaphor, or a cover for the reality 
of individual communication. The naive commonsense view in 
which only individuals exist and the social is ethereal has to be 
entirely reversed: “The individuals making up a society change 
from year to year, yet the number of suicides is the same so long as 
the society itself does not change.” The individual, not the social 
is the transient reality; Tarde is the enemy here:
It has been thought that this conclusion might be 
avoided through the observation that this very continu-
ity was the work of individuals and that, consequently, 
to account for it there was no need to ascribe to social 
phenomena a sort of transcendency in relation to indi-
vidual life (S: 272).
However, this is not how things work. What Tarde would like 
to persuade his readers is that anything regarding the social is 
about personal transmission “from an individual parent, teacher, 
friend, neighbor, or comrade to another individual.”
If we think of this model vertically, we can see how Tarde’s 
inter-individual approach is entirely isomorphic to the inherit-
ance of acquired characters, where transmission is personal, from 
the experience of one generation to that of the next. This is for 
Durkheim the most flagrant misunderstanding of what the social 
(as a collective tendency) is; exactly as for Weismann personal 
heredity is the misunderstanding par excellence of how heredity 
as a collective entity works. Both forms of transmission, the social 
for Durkheim and heredity for Weismann, have instead a “very 
special nature” (S: 272), which must be recognized in its entirety.
A few pages later, Durkheim recapitulates the theme of the 
whole chapter and finds a scientific validation (or at least, a 
companion) to this anti-Tarde strategy. Again, it is worth citing 
the passage in its entirety:
Such a way of considering the individual’s relations to 
society also recalls the idea assigned the individual’s 
relations with the species or the race by contemporary 
zoologists. The very simple theory has been increas-
ingly abandoned that the species is only an individual 
perpetuated chronologically and generalized spacially. 
Indeed it conflicts with the fact that the variations pro-
duced in a single instance become specific only in very 
rare and possibly doubtful cases. The distinctive charac-
teristics of the race change in the individual only as they 
change in the race in general. The latter has therefore 
some reality whence come the various shapes it assumes 
among individual beings, far from its consisting simply 
of a generalization of these beings. We naturally cannot 
regard these doctrines as finally demonstrated. But it 
is enough for us to show that our sociological concep-
tions, without being borrowed from another order of 
research, are indeed not without analogies to the most 
positive sciences. (S: 285, my italics)
The first text Durkheim cites is Delage (Structure du proto-
plasme), a Lamarckian author, but the reference is specifically to 
the pages where Weismann is discussed. The second reference is 
explicitly to Weismann, “and all the theories akin to Weissmann’s 
[sic]” Durkheim writes. Durkheim appears here like a solitary 
runner who raises his head at the end of a hard event to look for 
some support. Here, he finds Weismann: no matter the conces-
sion to the criticisms of his fellow nationals (“We naturally cannot 
regard these doctrines as finally demonstrated”), no matter the 
denial of any subordination or weakness of its sociological empire 
(“without being borrowed from another order of research”), 
Durkheim is content to have found an analogy in the positive 
sciences for his sociological anti-empiricism.
ConCLUsion
In this article, I have illustrated the strategic uses of Weismann’s 
work in Durkheim. Although I am not claiming that the German 
embryologist was his only scientific inspiration to purify sociol-
ogy, what Weismann certainly offered to Durkheim was a precious 
scientific ally to get rid of the empiricism of Lamarckian theory in 
which heredity resulted from the accumulation of individual vari-
ations. After reading Weismann, this Lamarckian view was seen 
by Durkheim as completely analogous to the various sociologies 
that understood the social as accumulation of individual actions. 
In a Latourian sense (Latour, 1993), the purification strategy of 
Durkheim actually depended on a (hidden) hybridization with 
Weismann’s biology.
It is obviously important to delimit this claim of a radical 
purification to Durkheim’s own work, rather than the whole 
post-Durkheimian tradition (for instance, Mauss), or even the 
late Durkheim of Elementary Forms (1912) where the society–
individual cleavage is somehow more nuanced.5 Nonetheless, 
with all the necessary qualifications and caveats, my reading of 
5 I thank the second reviewer for this important observation.
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a profound hybridization of Durkheim on the Weismannian 
stock may contribute to offer an alternative reading of the schism 
between the social and the biological, from which I started.
According to a mainstream historiography, which informs 
handbooks and teaching materials, the social sciences at 
some point broke with outmoded biologistic models, making 
themselves free for more sophisticated, non-organic ways of 
explanation. The social was finally discovered. However, why 
was this emancipation from outmoded ways of thinking pos-
sible, or even necessary, after a certain point? Historian Dorothy 
Ross argues, for instance, that, with reference to the American 
context, “from about 1880 to 1905 the social sciences did not 
appear to feel that their free borrowings [from biology] placed 
them under threat (…) After 1905, however, there is evidence 
of greater sensitivity to, and defensiveness against, both biol-
ogy and psychology, in the face of new currents within these 
subjects  –  Mendelian genetics…” (Ross, 1993, p. 100). The 
argument is here that (to limit my analysis at the relationship 
with biology), when the pressure from the biological got worse, 
after 1900 (when Mendel was rediscovered, and, one can assume, 
eugenics started) the social sciences no longer felt comfortable 
sharing their epistemic premises with biologists. High tensions 
were emerging and a peaceful coexistence was now at risk. While 
the chronology of this interpretation is (more or less) correct, 
I think that the relationship between cause and effect is reversed. 
My article on Durkheim and Weismann, as my previous one on 
Meloni (2016b), illustrates how the social sciences were not put 
under any greater threat by biological arguments when Mendel 
was “rediscovered,” courtesy hard heredity. It is rather that 
now for the first time, the social sciences found a way out from 
biologism. Why? Because as a result of Galton, Weismann and 
genetics, biology made possible for the first time the circulation 
of a concept of heredity that was utterly separated from the social 
environment. In this way, the latter was freed from any direct 
connection with the biological. Heredity was secluded away in 
the germ plasm (later, in the gene), becoming less invasive than 
in previous Lamarckian forms. It was now possible to distinguish 
neatly and for the first time between heredity and sociocultural 
transmission. Durkheim’s sociological explanations of the 
reproduction of criminality in families is perfectly in line with 
what a geneticist like Thomas Hunt Morgan would say, three 
decades later, with regard to the epistemological shortcoming 
of the eugenicist’s pedigree. For Durkheim “we cannot deter-
mine the relative contribution of heredity among all criminal 
vocations, (….) [If] the son of a thief becomes a thief himself it 
does not follow that his immoral nature is a legacy bequeathed 
him by his father. To interpret the facts in this way we would 
have to be able to isolate the effects of heredity from those of 
circumstances, education, etc” (DL: 257, my italics). In  1925, 
Morgan wrote similarly that: “The pedigrees that have been 
published showing a long history of social misconduct, crime, 
alcoholism, debauchery, and venereal diseases are open to the 
same criticism [i.e., conflating biological and social heredity] 
from a genetic point of view; for it is obvious that these groups 
of individuals have lived under demoralizing social conditions 
that might swamp a family of average persons. It is not surprising 
that, once begun from whatever cause, the effects may be to a 
large extent communicated rather than inherited” [my italics, 
quoted in Allen (2011), p. 201–2]. What seems a sociological gift, 
i.e., distinguishing communication from heredity, is in fact also 
perfectly in tune with the hard-heredity revolution promoted by 
Weismann that culminated with genetics. Morgan named it “the 
two-fold method of human inheritance” [in Allen (2011)], which 
clearly converges with Durkheim’s view of a homo duplex (S: 171 
“man is double”) and Kroeber’s dualism between the organic and 
superorganic. Rather than being enemies, sociology and genet-
ics have shared a certain epistemic contiguity in the twentieth 
century, where a radical separation of heredity and heritage 
was made possible (mostly via Weismann). Whether this will 
continue to be the case in the current century is a different matter 
that I cannot address in the limited space of this article.
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